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THE ART OF JURY PERSUASION
FRANCIS X. BUSCH
ONEST lawsuits-meaning thereby controversies in which both
litigants are sincere in their contentions-necessarily involve
disputes either as to facts or applicable law. If the dispute in-
volves the determination of applicable law, it will be resolved at some
stage of the proceedings by the court. If it involves a determination of
questions of fact, that determination must be by jury or by the court
sitting as a trier of the fact. This article concerns the trial of disputed
questions of fact by jurors summoned and selected pursuant to law,
and is directed particularly to the graduate student or young lawyer
who has decided to specialize in trial work.
The presentation of the evidence from which the facts in dispute are
to be determined is or should be the function of the trained advocate
or trial lawyer.
Worthwhile advocacy, as related to the representation by a lawyer
of a client in the trial of contested issues, demands more than mere
appearance and plea. Applied to a jury case it should embrace (i) an
adequate preparation of the law and the facts to determine upon a sus-
tainable theory of recovery or defense; (z) the selection of a fair and
impartial jury; (3) a carefully thought out and persuasive opening
statement; (4) an orderly, logical and persuasive presentation of the
evidence; (5) as to the opponent's case, an intelligent and persuasive
cross-examination; (6) an orderly, pertinent, logical and persuasive
argument; and (7) to the extent permitted, seeing to it that after the
evidence and arguments are closed, the jury is fairly and fully in-
structed by the court.
Each of the above steps should be approached and taken with the
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idea dominant that everything an advocate says or does makes an im-
pression on a juror's mind. The aim of the skilled trial lawyer is to per-
suade the jury, as the result of these successive and cumulating imprcs-
sions, (a) that his client's cause is just and (b) that he (the lawyer) has
presented it fairly.
1. ADEQUATE PREPARATION OF THE LAW AND THE FACTS
Preparation is the sine qua non of successful advocacy. There is no
novelty in this suggestion. It has been the theme of successful trial
lawyers from the time of Cicero; of law writers since the days of Coke.
Advocacy alone, however brilliant, cannot supply deficiencies in
preparation. This applies to every step in a trial: the examination of the
jury, the opening statemtnt, presentation of the case, cross-examination
and argument.
Obviously, the first task confronting the lawyer who is consulted by
a client as to a possible right of recovery or defense to a charge or claim
asserted against him, is to determine, provisionally on the basis of what
is told him by his client, whether he has a legally recognized right of
action or defense. If the facts, as stated, fall in the more usual categories,
i.e., civil actions for damages for breach of simple contract, assault and
battery, trespass, negligence, trover, replevin, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and criminal prosecutions for murder, arson, rape, burgla-
ry, robbery, or larceny, little preliminary investigation of the law is
indicated. On the other hand, where the facts of a stated case, civil or
criminal, are more complicated, and not covered by the more familiar
rules of law which should be known to every practitioner, the careful
advocate should make an examination of the law sufficient to enable
him to form a provisional theory of recovery and know what facts
must exist to bring the case within it.
The theory of recovery or defense having been determined upon,
the investigation of the facts should be proceeded with, thoroughly
and carefully. Space will only permit a suggestion, without elaboration.
of the avenues of investigation.
First: A thorough examination of one's client;
Second: Viewing the locus in quo or the instrumentalities involved
in the dispute;
Third: Interviewing all known witnesses (whether friendly or hos-
tile) and securing signed statements from thein, whenever possible;
Fourth: The taking of full advantage of statutory and code provi-
sions permitting the preliminary examination of adverse parties. their
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agents or employees, requiring identification and disclosure of written
evidence in the possession of adverse parties; and requiring sworn an-
swers of adverse parties or their agents to pertinent interrogatories or
requested admissions.
Where the case is of a nature to be aided thereby, the taking of
photographs of places, persons or instrumentalities, and the preparation
of illustrative maps, plats, models or experimental apparatus, will be-
come an essential part of pre-trial preparation.
Item Fourth, enumerated above, is of major importance. Within the
last thirty years, the Federal Government and practically every state in
the Union have adopted new practice acts or authorized rules of court
providing for pre-trial discovery. Every lawyer intending to engage in
trial work should make himself intimately familiar with his local prac-
tice act, the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, the pro-
cedural rules of his local courts, and the decisions under such acts and
rules indicating the extent to which they may be used in pre-trial prepa-
ration.
The foregoing suggested preparation should prove adequate as a
basis for drafting pleadings or amending pleadings which will present
the issues of fact to be tried.
Later pre-trial preparation should include (i) a careful study of all
facts accumulated to develop admissible circumstantial (as distin-
guished from direct) evidence from which legitimate inferences may
be drawn to corroborate direct evidence, (z) in an appropriate case,
the intelligent selection of experts and the preparation of their testi-
mony, and (3) the preparation of intended witnesses for the giving of
their testimony.
Pre-trial examination of witnesses.-If the lawyer is to make an ade-
quate presentation of his case, he must, wherever possible, know exact-
ly what facts lie within the knowledge of particular witnesses. In no
other way can he formulate pertinent questions. This knowledge can
only be obtained by talking with the witnesses before trial and ascer-
taining the extent of their knowledge. The pre-trial examination of
witnesses is not only proper; it is essential to the orderly administration
of justice, and the highest judicial authority has expressly approved it.'
To what extent may a witness be advised or cautioned ( i ) as to his
manner while on the witness stand, and (2) as to what he may be asked
on cross-examination? If a witness is naturally timid or nervous, he may
properly be told there is nothing for him to fear or be apprehensive
1 Storm v. United States, 94 US. 76 (1876).
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about if he tells the truth. If he is inclined to flippancy or the use of im-
proper or slang expressions, he may properly be told that such an atti-
tude and such language are not proper in a courtroom. If he is given to
making quick and unconsidered answers, lie may properly be told to
listen to the questions asked and be sure he understands them before he
answers. He may properly be asked what his answer on cross-examina-
tion will be if he is asked a particular question. One of the common traps
laid by some cross-examiners is to assume a belligerent, finger-shaking
attitude and demand in a loud voice, "Whom have you talked to about
this case?" A frightened witness, suspecting some sinister implication
in the case, will often reply, "No one." And then the question, "Not
even your lawyer?" and the answer "No." Later the cross-examiner
will argue that the witness lacks credibility because it is obvious he
never would have been called to the stand unless he had told someone
that he knew something about the case. Certainly, a lawyer has a right
to suggest to a witness before trial that he may be asked this question on
cross-examination. If the prospective witness replies to the lawyer that
he has not talked to anyone, he should be reminded that lie is even at
that moment talking to the lawyer about it and that if asked that ques-
tion at the trial, he should answer it, as every other question, truthfully,
giving the name of everyone lie may have talked to about the case.
A similar situation is presented in another trick practiced by some ad-
vocates: a rapid question on cross-examination, "Have you been paid
anything for your testimony?" The implication is plain. If, however,
the witness has been paid or promised payment for his lost time and
traveling expense (a justifiable procedure), he may answer, "Yes" and
fail to qualify his answer. It is certainly ethical practice to suggest to the
witness that if he is asked that question to tell the truth and the whole
truth: that he has not been paid anything for his testimony, but he has
been paid or promised payment for his lost time and actual expenses
going to and from court.
Trial brief on the law.-In every important case involving uncom-
mon questions of law, the trial lawyer should have an adequate trial
brief, i.e., a written memorandum of authorities dealing with the com-
petency and admissibility of proposed and anticipated evidence and, if
for the plaintiff, authorities which, at the close of the evidence, will be
adequate to meet an anticipated motion of his adversary that the court
direct a verdict. Such a brief should also include a memorandum of all
apparently antagonistic cases with an analysis indicating whatever dis-
tinction may be made between them and the case at bar, and references
to later cases, if any, distinguishing or overruling them.
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I. SELECTION OF THE JURY
Subject to constitutional restrictions, the methods by which persons
are summoned for jury duty in the state courts are entirely within the
control of the state legislatures.2 The method of selecting persons to
serve in the federal courts is prescribed by a federal statute.3 While
these laws differ widely in detail, there is a pattern common to all of
them, viz., the creation by impartial officers of a general list of persons
selected or made up from poll lists, tax lists or directories, and the
selection by lot from that list of the names of particular persons which
are delivered for service to the sheriff or other summoning officer. The
persons so summoned constitute a panel from which trial jurors are
selected.
Procedures for the examination of jurors voir dire, i.e., to determine
competency or desirability to serve in a particular case, also vary wide-
ly. In some jurisdictions, the examination is wholly by the court; in
others, by the court, supplemented by such additional examination by
the attorneys for the respective parties as the court in its discretion will
permit;' in others, statutes expressly give the right to attorneys to con-
duct such examinations;' in numerous jurisdictions, in the absence of
statute but by force of long-continued practice, the attorneys alone
conduct such examinations, subject to such limitations as the court, in its
discretion, may impose.; In the absence of statutes expressly permitting
attorney examination, it has been held that the court may conduct the
entire examination; 7 and, generally, it is held that where, either by cus-
tom, court permission or statute, counsel are permitted to examine, the
character and extent of the examination lies within the sound discretion
of the court, and the exercise of that discretion is reviewable on a claim
of error only in cases of palpable abuse."
Purpose of jury examination.-The purpose of the examination of a
2Tynan v. United States, 297 Fed. 177 (C.A. 9th, 1924), cert. denied z66 U.S. 604
(1924); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); People ex rel. Denny v. Traeger,
372 Ill. 11, 22 N.E. 2d 679 (1939).
862 Stat. 952 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. S1864, 1867 (1948).
4 This is the rule in the federal courts. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 47 (a); Fed. Rules
Crim. Proc. 24(a).
5 See, as illustrative, McCrary Co. v. Phillips, ,22 Ala. 117, 130 So. 805 (1930); People
v. Hosier, 132 App. Div. 146, 116 N.Y. Supp. 91i (st Dep't, 19o9); State v. Lloyd,
138 Wash. 8, 244 Pac. i3o (1926).
6 Illinois is in this category.
7 Carroll v. United States, t6 F. 2d 951 (C.A. zd, 1927), cert. denied 273 U.S. 763
(1927); People v. Hayek, 243 Mich. 546, 220 N.W. 790 (1928).
S Foley v. Cudahy Packing Co., 119 Iowa 246, 93 N.W. 284 (1903); Moore v. Ed-
monds, 384 1II. 535, 52 N.E. ,d 216 (1943).
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prospective juror is twofold: to elicit information as to the existence of
legal ground for a challenge for cause, or information as to his back-
ground of association and experience from which the examiner may
intelligently exercise a peremptory challenge."
Examination of jurors by court or counsel.-Where, under prevailing
practice, the voir dire examination of jurors is conducted wholly by the
trial judge, the advocate has little or no opportunity to influence either
the selection or disposition of the juror. He does have the right, where
the court's examination is superficial and incomplete, to submit to and
ask the court to put to the juror appropriate additional questions de-
signed to determine the juror's competency and impartiality. 0 And, it
has been held that a refusal to propound such additional questions is
error." In such a situation, the advocate's approach to the court should
be quiet and courteous. If possible, the suggestions should be in writing
and handed to the judge. The impressions on the jury which are to be
avoided are (a) that the advocate questions the court's judgment as to
the eligibility of the juror, and (b) that he is trying, through the court,
to pry further and unnecessarily into the juror's private affairs.
Where the practice permits a general examination to be conducted
by the attorneys for the respective parties, an entirely different situa-
tion is presented. Here the expert trial lawyer has an opportunity to
register a favorable initial impression. He may preface his questions
with a subtly worded apology for asking any questions at all, saying
that he only does so in the discharge of an obligation to his client to see
that twelve men are selected who have had no associations or experi-
ences which might at the start of the case make them lean a little more
toward one side than the other. When he has exhausted the usual rou-
tine-name, address, present occupation, previous employments (gen-
erally, not specifically), acquaintance with parties and lawyers, wheth-
er he or any member of his family or close friend ever had a similiar
litigation, previous jury experiences, general prejudice against or sym-
pathy for the type of case presented or for or against the particular
plaintiff or defendant, etc., the skilled trial lawyer may, with a gesture
or intonation of voice denoting confidence in the jury, conclude with
9 The number of permitted peremptory challenges, in both civil and criminal cases,
varies widely in the different states.
1ODonovan v. People, 139 H11. 412, 28 N.E. 964 (891); Croft v. State, 73 Ga. App.
318, 36 S.E. 2d zoo (1945). But see Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 195 At]. 532 (1937),
196 Atl. 819 (1938), cert. denied 303 U.S. 66o (1938).
ii Stephens v. People, 38 Mich. 739 (1878); People v. Coen, 2o5 Cal. 596, 271 Pac.
1074 (0928); Tubb v. State. io9 Tex. Cr. R. 455, S.W. 2d 152 (1928).
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a question something like this, "Now, Mr. Blank, I have asked you
a lot of questions. I apologize for having asked so many. You know the
state of your own mind and so, without any more specific questions, I
want to put it right up to you: all either side wants here is a fair and
impartial jury, one which will decide the case squarely on the law and
the evidence. Do you think you are that kind of a juror?" Or, with the
same preamble, "Now, I want to put it squarely up to you: if you had
a case such as my client has here, would you be satisfied to accept on the
jury a man who feels just the same as you do as you sit there in the
jury box?" The writer, in his experience, has found that such questions
not only flatter the juror, but they tend to keel) his mind riveted on
the ideal: fairness and strict impartiality.
When the first juror has been subjected to a rather thorough examina-
tion, most trial lawyers deem it advisable not to cover exactly the same
ground with the other eleven. Such a repetition becomes monotonous,
causes the jury as a whole to lose interest, and slows up the tempo of the
trial. It is considered much better practice, after having asked the other
eleven jurors their names, addresses, present and former employments
and associations, to say, "Now, Mr. X, you heard the questions I put to
Mr. Blank and the answers he gave. I don't want to waste your time or
the time of the court in going all over that again. Let me ask you this:
If I were to put the same questions to you that I put to Mr. Blank,
would your answers be the same as his?" And, if he answers, "Yes,"
follow with the summary question: "Then I take it you know of no
reason why you wouldn't make an absolutely fair and impartial juror
in this case?"
Manner of jury exaination.-The skilled examiner so places him-
self as to face directly the juror being interrogated and to engage his
undivided attention. He concentrates but affects an outward appear-
ance of complete relaxation so that he may put the juror at ease. The
tone of his speech is quiet and well-modulated, but properly empha-
sized to avoid the monotony which inevitably loosens the hold on the
juror's attention and weakens the effectiveness of the interrogation. He
phrases his questions in good but simple English. He speaks distinctly
and fluently. Without noticeable pause or change of manner, he fol-
lows each answer of the juror with another pertinent question. The
examination is conducted as rapidly as the circumstances will permit;
and this for a number of sufficient reasons. The rapid examination is not
only better calculated to maintain the attention of the juror under
examination but, if skillfully conducted, arrests the attention of the
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remaining jurors. By such an examination the advocate creates the im-
pression of not unnecessarily wasting time; yet, by asking as many
questions as the limited time permits, he accomplishes the result toward
which all such inquiry is directed-the revelation of as much of the
juror's frame of mind as it is possible to get.
Il1. OPENING STATEMENT
Under prevailing American practice, an opening statement, whether
made by plaintiff or defendant, is virtually restricted to a statement of
the evidence to be introduced in support of the claim or defense.' 2
The experienced trial lawyer representing a plaintiff realizes the
value of an opening statement. It is his first real opportunity to place his
client's cause and himself before the jurors. They are in an ideal state of
mind to receive an impression. They are, as yet, entirely ignorant of the
facts of the case in which they have been selected and sworn. The
brief statement by court or counsel which may have preceded their
voir dire has told them little more than that they have been called into
the box to try a particular kind of a civil or criminal case. Their interest
is probably keener at this time than it will be at any subsequent stage of
the trial. The skilled advocate takes full advantage of the situation.
He may not argue his case,' 3 but an unelaborated statement of prov-
able facts, so logically arranged and forcefully presented as to compel
a desired conclusion, if not in itself an argument, can be as effective in
fixing an initial impression which may become ultimate conviction. A
well conceived opening statement on behalf of the plaintiff can be
made for a jury what the plans and specifications of an architect are for
the builder; the jury is unconsciously undergoing persuasion as each
witness makes his expected contribution to the planned structure.
The position of the defendant's advocate is quite different but he,
too, will weigh carefully the possibilities of advancing his client's cause
by an appropriate opening statement made at the proper time. He may,
because of the facts in the particular case, waive the making of an open-
ing statement altogether; he may reserve it until the completion of the
12 The English practice, which is followed in a few of the American states, permits
a statement of wider scope, i.e., a statement of the claim or defense, and an outline of
the evidence by which it is hoped to establish the one or the other, the legal grounds
and authorities in favor of the claim or proposed defense, and an anticipation and
answer (by facts or law) of an expected defense. Chitty's Practice S 881 (15th ed.,
1874).
13 Posell v. Herscovitz, 237 Mass. 513, 130 N.E. 69 (1921); Wells v. Ann Arbor Ry.
Co., 184 Mich. i, i5o N.W. 340 ('9'5); Giffen v. City of Lewiston, 6 Idaho 231, 55
Pac..4.5 (1898).
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plaintiff's or prosecutor's case; or he may, if he considers he has a
complete defense, decide it is the better tactic to follow the plaintiff's
statement immediately with his own statement of what he expects to
prove. Where this can be done, it is highly desirable. The jury then,
before any evidence is introduced, will have both the claim and the
defense in mind and will naturally receive the plaintiff's evidence with
the reservation that final judgment must be withheld until the defense
has been heard.
Pre-trial preparation of opening statement.-The opening statement,
whether made by the plaintiff or the defendant, should be carefully
thought out before trial. Some trial lawyers in important cases make it
a part of their pre-trial preparation to dictate such a statement to a
stenographer in the same free style they would employ in addressing a
jury, and then examine a transcript of the dictation for omissions and
errors in content and style. The purpose of this is definitely not to
memorize such a statement, but to fix its content and orderly sequence
in mind.
Avoid overstatement of case.-The cardinal rule as to opening state-
ments is that they should not overstate the advocate's case. In the first
place, the deliberate inclusion in an opening statement of matters which
cannot be established by admissible evidence may constitute reversible
error. 4 Secondly, if the stated facts are not proved, an alert opponent
may argue a failure of proof, even though what has actually been
proved is sufficient to make a case. Such an argument is often persua-
sive. Thirdly, and not the least important, a failure on the part of an
advocate to "make good" on his promise of expected proof weakens the
jurors' confidence in him and his client's cause. It is far better to under-
state one's case than to overstate it. Indeed, some trial lawyers make it a
rule deliberately to understate their expected evidence, so they may
later argue that not only does the evidence sustain every averment of
the opening statement, but goes further and makes an even stronger
case.
Proper content and form of opening statement.-The opening state-
ment should be a statement of facts provable by competent evidence.'
It should be in summary form, and not recite the particular testimony
of identified witnesses or detail by reading the precise contents of docu-
14Brown v. Leek, ZI Ala. 319, 128 So. 6o8 (1930); Pioneer Reserve Ass'n v. Jones,
i il l. App. 156 (9o3); Scripps v. Reilly, 35 Mich. 371, 24 Am. Rep. 575 (1877).
15 Atlanta Life Ins. Co. v. Canady, 225 Ala. 377, 143 So. 561 (1932); Burke v. South
Boulder Canon Ditch Co., 76 Colo. 354, 231 Pac. 674 (1924); Shields v. Kansas City
Ry. Co., 264 S.W. 89o (Mo., 1914).
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ments.16 The language of the statement should be plain. It should be de-
livered fluently, without hesitation or breaks. Above all, it should be
given with complete assurance and in a manner conveying that assur-
ance. A preparation which steeps the advocate in the facts of his case,
and a pre-trial preparation such as has been suggested of the statement
itself, are the best means of engendering that assurance.
IV. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE; DIRECT EXAMINATION
Evidence presented to a jury may be by a view of the premises or
instrumentality involved in the case, by sworn witnesses to facts in
issue, by material writings properly authenticated, and by physical ob-
jects (real evidence) properly identified.
Of the many requirements and responsibilities of the advocate, the
most important is the effective presentation of the available. testimonial
and documentary evidence to sustain an asserted claim or defense. It is
on the basis of that presentation that he will ask for the jury's verdict
and the court's judgment. "Effective," as used here, connotes two
things: ( i ) a presentation by which the successive testimonial and evi-
dentiary impacts become cumulatively persuasive, and (z) an ultimate
"record" in which all of the available evidence clearly appears.
Motion for the separation of 'witnesses.-By the common law and
statutes in many states either party to an action may, before any evi-
dence is offered, move the court for a rule to exclude from the court-
room all of the witnesses except the one undergoing examination.
When requested, the order, although not a matter of right, is rarely
withheld.17 Greenleaf characterized the rule as one "devised for the
discovery of truth and the exposure of falsehood and well adapted to
the ends designed.""i Specifically, the motion for the rule is prompted
by the belief that where there are a number of witnesses to an occur-
rence they will, if permitted to hear each other's testimony, conscious-
ly or unconsciously harmonize their stories, and if one of them falls a
victim to a sharp cross-examination the others will be forewarned and
avoid the same pitfall. Whether the advocate should move for the rule
should depend upon the situation in the particular case in hand. If, for
example, there are on each side a substantially equal number of wit-
nesses to the principal facts an order of exclusion would not appear to
16Pietsch v. Pietsch, 245 111. 454, 92 N.E. 325 (191o); Scripps v. Reilly, 35 Mich.
371, 24 Am. Rep. 575 (1877).
17 Ryan v. Couch, 66 Ala. 244 (i88o); Noone v. Olehy, 297 I11. i6o, 13o N.E. 476
(1921).
Is Greenleaf, Evidence 1 432 (1 3th ed., 1876).
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advantage either side; on the other hand, if the movant's proof is largely
written evidence, and he is opposed by a number of witnesses, he may
consider that an advantage is to be gained by an order of exclusion.
Pre-trial determination of the order in 'which witnesses are to be
called.-A feature in the presentation of evidence, often neglected, is a
careful pre-trial consideration by the advocate of the order in which
he will offer his witnesses and documentary proof. In arranging the
order in which to present his witnesses, the advocate will be governed
by various considerations. The witnesses should be arranged, so far as
possible, to present the case in its natural and logical sequence. This
builds up the case step by step to its logical conclusion. Documentary
proof should, wherever possible, be associated with the testimony of a
particular witness and offered in connection with his testimony.
The creation of a good initial impression is a long step toward ulti-
mate persuasion. To accomplish this, one of the best, if not the best,
witnesses should be selected to "lead off." The ideal first witness is an
alert person of keen perception, whose background places him beyond
the range of impeachment as to his general credibility; one whose dis-
position is to think before he speaks, and who possesses the ability to
express himself intelligently and clearly, and in the fewest possible
words. If possible, he should be a witness who has not been interviewed
by the other side.
There are sound reasons for calling your best witness first. Every
experienced trial lawyer knows that the first occurrence witness called
is subjected to the most searching cross-examination. Almost invariably,
he is taken over every major-and minor phase of the transaction; he is
asked to fix directions, identify structures, estimate distances, describe
weather conditions, and answer questions directed to many other de-
tails. Ordinarily, no subsequent witness is subjected to such an exhaus-
tive cross-examination. Moreover, the jurors are hearing the story for
the first time. They are curious and therefore alert and prepared to pay
close attention to everything which the first witness says. If his direct
testimony is clear-cut and positive, and he successfully survives cross-
examination, it will be hard to erase from the jurors' minds the impres-
sion which his testimony has made.
What has been said about the desirability of selecting a good witness
to commence the plaintiff's evidence applies with even greater force to
the defendant. Despite such cautions as may have been given the jurors
by the court or defendant's counsel to reserve judgment until they have
heard all of the evidence, the fact remains that the jurors have heard
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the plaintiff's evidence first, and if it has been well presented, the de-
fendant must overcome the handicap of more or less fixed impressions.
Many trial lawyers representing a defendant believe there is no better
way to do this than to commence the presentation of their evidence
either with a devastating piece of written evidence or the testimony of
their best witness. If such a witness "stands up" under cross-examina-
tion (and, as in the case of the plaintiff's first witness, he will ordinarily
have the cross-examiner's heaviest ordnance turned upon him), the
defendant will have laid a foundation upon which to complete what he
hopes will be a sufficient defense.
It is quite as important to finish the presentation of one's case on a
high note. If the situation in the particular case permits it, the evidence
should close with a strong witness or with a strong piece of written
evidence. The build-up to a climax is sound strategy. As the late Max
Steuer, the great New York trial lawyer, once remarked, "Your case
should unfold like a well written novel, chapter by chapter, not only
sustaining but increasing interest until the climax." Such a presentation
is calculated to persuade.
Presentation of documentary evidence.-ln many cases a consider-
able part of a plaintiff's or defendant's evidence is documentary. It is in
connection with the presentation of such evidence that the inexperi-
enced advocate often sacrifices a legitimate advantage. Many times such
evidence-letters, telegrams, book entries and the like-are merely
identified without reading or showing them to the jury. If they are
directly vital in character, they will, of course, be read or referred to
and discussed in argument. Frequently, however, such evidence, while
not in itself determinative, has a distinct collateral value, but is not even
referred to in the argument. It is true that when the evidence and argu-
ments are closed, all of the exhibits usually go with the jurors to their
jury room, but there, in the confusion of a haphazard discussion, writ-
ten evidence which has not been specifically called to their attention
may or may not be read. The result may well be a verdict in which
such evidence has never been understood or considered. If a piece of
documentary evidence is important enough to justify its offer as evi-
dence, surely it must be of sufficient importance to require that the jury
understand and know what it is. When a paper is offered and received
in evidence, it should either be clearly and distinctly read into the
record or passed to the jurors so they may read it; and, if in no more
than a dozen words, it should be referred to in the argument and the
jurors invited to read and consider it when they retire for their delib-
erations.
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Making sure that the witnesses are heard.-The best testimony is of
no value unless it is heard by the jury. The failure of a witness to make
himself heard is usually the fault of the advocate. If the examiner sits
down opposite about the center of the jury box and faces the witness,
the witness is naturally going to talk to him and, ordinarily, only loud
enough for the lawyer to hear him. The result is that the jurors, well to
the right or left of the lawyer, and some of them behind him, do not
hear the witness. This can be avoided if the examiner will take a stand-
ing position at the end of the jury box furthest removed from the wit-
ness so that he puts the entire jury between and on a line with him and
the witness, and then makes the witness talk up so that he can easily hear
him. If the witness talks low or lets his voice drop, he can ask him to
speak up. If he is in doubt, from the actions of some of the jurors,
whether they are all hearing him, it is permissible to put a general in-
quiry to the jurors, if they are all able to hear the witness. If the witness
talks so rapidly that the advocate fears that the effect of some of his
testimony is being lost on the jury, he should ask him to talk more
slowly. A tactic sometimes employed by trial lawyers in examining a
rapid-talking witness is to wait until he has finished a long answer, and
then ask the court reporter to read it. This serves a dual purpose: it
halts the witness temporarily, and when the examination is resumed he
will, for a time at least, talk more slowly; it also serves to determine
whether the court stenographer is getting for the record everything
that the witness says.
Fori of questions.-Questions should, so far as the nature of the in-
quiry will permit, be phrased in simple, definite and clearly understand-
able language. They should be interrogations and not assertions. They
should be concise and certain; not ambiguous or misleading. They
should be confined to a single item, and not combine two or more
separate inquiries. They should not be argumentative. Except in special
circumstances, they should not contain recitals and repetitions of
answers previously given. They should avoid assumptions of unproved
or disputed facts. Except where opinion evidence is admissible, they
should call for answers of facts rather than conclusions or opinions.
Except in exceptional circumstances, questions asked on direct exami-
nation should not be leading.
Avoid leading questions.-It is not within the scope of this article to
discuss what are and what are not leading questions. It is pertinent to
discuss the vice of leading questions as a factor in the art of persuasion.
The advocate who is keen that the presentation of his evidence and
every feature connected with it shall impress the jury will, to the great-
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est extent possible, avoid leading questions. It is not that such questions
are in themselves consequential; if objected to they can be refrained
and put to the witness in proper form. Their vice lies in the fact that
they provoke unnecessary objections which subject the examiner to
needless interruptions. These tend to destroy the effectiveness of the
story necessarily produced through question and answer which he is
trying to unfold for the information and interest of the jury and for
the benefit of his client.
Do not repeat previous answers.-No habit in the examination of wit-
nesses, whether it be on direct or cross-examination, is more pernicious
than that of repeating all or part of the previous answer. The least
important objection to it is that it unnecessarily extends the record.
The principal objection to it is that by this repetition the new matter
in the question is obscured from both the witness and the jurors, and
the effect of continuity which might be obtained from following one
question with another question, uncomplicated by repetition, is lost.
Real evidence.-As an incident to direct examination it is sometimes
necessary or considered desirable to offer relevant physical objects
(real evidence), such, for example, as the weapons or other objects
claimed to have been used in the commission of a crime, 9 clothes worn
at the time of an occurrence, 20 a ladder found near the home of the
victim of a kidnapping, 21 a bottle of liquor in a prosecution for its illegal
sale "22 a piece of iron in a civil action for damages for injuries allegedly
due to a defect.23 In all such cases where physical objects are involved
as incidents to direct examination, proof of their authenticity and rele-
vance must be made. 4 When such proof is made, they may be exhibited
to the jury and offered in evidence. Where such real evidence is avail-
able and admissible, its persuasiveness with a jury cannot be over-
estimated. Such objects fix the testimony to which they relate in the
minds of the jurors and their presence before them throughout the
trial, and in the jury room (where, by local practice or statute, such
articles are permitted to go to the jury room) are a continual visual re-
19 Patton v. State, 246 Ala. 639, 21 So. 2d 844 (1945); State v. Schenk, 236 Iowa 178,
18 N.W. 2d 169 (1945).
2oWaschow v. Kelly Coal Co., 245 IIL. 516, 9z N.E. 303 (1910).
21 State v. Hauptrnann, iiS NJ.L. 412, 18o Ad. 8o9 (Ct. Err. & App., 1935).
22 State v. Robertson, 158 La. 300, 103 So. 8zi (1925).
23 Tudor Iron Works v. Weber, 129 Ill. 535, z N.E. 1078 (1889).
24 Quincy Gas & Electric Co. v. Baumann, 203 111. 295, 67 N.E. 807 (19o3); People v.
Morse, 196 N.Y. 3o6, 89 N.E. 816 09o9).
254 Wigmore, Evidence S if51 ( 3d ed., 1940).
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minder of that testimony. The examination to qualify such objects
should be carefully planned in advance of trial to apprehend expected
technical objections and so that it will be presented to the jury in a
manner which will arouse its interest.
Use of photographs, maps, plats, models and other illustrative mate-
rial.-Not falling within the definition of real evidence, but of a kindred
nature, are photographs, maps, plats, models and other illustrative mate-
rial. To be admissible, these must be proved to be accurate representa-
tions of the place or instrumentality in question. Such evidence, being
something seen rather than something heard, is particularly persuasive
with juries. As already stated, once offered in evidence, they are more
or less constantly before them, reminding them of the testimony of the
witnesses who have referred to them.
Courts have frequently declared the peculiar value of photographic
evidence.2 Some cases have held that a verdict contrary to the physical
facts disclosed by properly authenticated photographs should be set
aside.27 X-ray photographs are commonplace in both civil and criminal
trials, their admissibility unquestioned when they are properly authen-
ticated .28 Authorities have characterized such photographs as "highly
trustworthy evidence. ' 29 In the same category, to disprove specific
claims of disability or to prove malingering, are motion pictures30 and
motion sound pictures." The careful advocate, in his preparation, will
consider and exhaust the possibilities of utilizing evidence of this de-
monstrative and persuasive character.
Expert testimony.-Within an article of this scope consideration
cannot be given to the increasing importance of expert testimony.
Suffice it to say, that the field has broadened immeasurably to take in
hundreds of new articles and substances in daily use-the result of the
amazing advances in industrial chemistry and the other sciences during
the past fifty years. The modem advocate finds himself confronted
26 Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 36 (i88z); Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 477, 38 Am.
Rep. 464, 472 088x).
27 Hartley v. Rodd Lumber Co., z8z Mich. 652, 276 N.W. 712 (1937); Lessig v.
Reading Transit &Light Co., 270 Pa. 299, 113 Atl. 381 (1921).
2 8 Judeiko v. Chicago City Railway Co., i66 Ill. App. 14o (1911); Stevens v. Illinois
Central R. R. Co, 3o6 11. 370, 137 N.E. 859 (1923).
29 Kramer v. Henely, 227 Iowa 504, z88 N.W. 61o (1939); Eaker v. International
Shoe Co., i99 N.C. 379, 154 S.E. 667 (1930).
30 McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 II. App. 458, 27 N.E. zd 289 (1940); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Wright, 190 Miss. 53, 199 So. 289 (i4); Boyarski v. Zimmerman Corp.,
24o App. Div. 361, 27o N.Y. Supp. 134 (ist Dep't, 1934).
81 Commonwealth v. Roller, ioo Pa. Super. 125 (1930).
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with trials involving plastics, electronics, atomic energy, radio and
telephone transmission, airplane construction and operation, newly
discovered medicinal drugs and dozens of other new discoveries of
which the lawyer of the last century never heard. More often than not,
such questions demand the selection and use of experts. The advocate
should realize that the true value of any expert's testimony is measured
by the special education and experience of the one who gives it. He will
select a particular expert because he possesses the requisite education
and experience, and in presenting him as a witness he will, as an essential
part of his testimony, prove his qualifications. A tactic sometimes em-
ployed by a shrewd opponent to prevent a jury from learning the full
extent of the qualifications of an expert called by his adversary is to tell
the court he will admit the qualifications of the witness. The inexperi-
enced lawyer will then frequently drop the line of questioning designed
to show the witness' qualifications and proceed directly to the scientific
question in controversy. Often the trial court intervenes to tell the
examiner, "The witness' qualifications are conceded; proceed with
something else." It is submitted that the examining advocate who is thus
diverted from his intention to show the qualifications of his expert
witness has been unjustly deprived of a persuasive item of evidence. An
expert's opinion is worth just what his qualifications entitle it to and
no more. The more highly qualified he is, the more his opinion is worth.
The advocate who has put his client to the trouble and expense in
preparation of selecting a competent expert should insist, regardless of
any admission from the other side, on his right to prove such witness'
qualifications. If the court, in its zeal to hurry up the trial, prevents him
from doing so, he should save his exception. The validity of such an
exception, so far as the writer knows, has never been passed upon by
any court of last resort. When it does come before such a tribunal, the
logic in favor of being allowed to complete the examination of an ex-
pert to show his qualifications would seem to be unassailable.
V. CROSS-EXAMINATION
Greenleaf says of cross-examination that it "has been justly said to be
one of the principal, as it is certainly one of the most efficacious tests,
which the law has devised for the discovery of truth. ' 2 Wigmore de-
clares that the test of evidence by cross-examination is a vital feature of
Anglo-Saxon law; that
the belief that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is com-
parable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the conviction that no state-
82 Greenleaf, Evidence S 446 (13th ed., 1876).
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ment (unless by special exception) should be used as testimony until it has been
probed and sublimated by that test, has found increasing strength in lengthen-
ing experience.... Not even the abuses, the mishandlings, and the puerilities
which are so often found associated with cross-examination have availed to nul-
lify its value. It may be that in more than one sense it takes the place in our
system which torture occupied in the mediaeval system of the civilians. Never-
theless, it is beyond doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the dis-
covery of truth. 88
Admited that cross-examination is a mighty weapon, it should be
emphasized that it is also a dangerous weapon in the hands of the tyro-
a two-edged sword as likely to injure the inexperienced who wield it as
the adversary against whom it is drawn.
Charles Hughes, a highly regarded Chicago criminal trial lawyer of
an earlier day,34 had a set of rules respecting cross-examination which
he urged the young and ambitious trial lawyer to memorize and heed.
They ran something like this:
Rule i.-There are definite purposes in cross-examination. Know what they
are. Unless you have sound reason to hope you can accomplish one of these pur-
poses, do not cross-examine.
Rule 2.-If you decide to cross-examine, keep control of your witness. Do not
ask questions which give him the scope and opportunity to hurt you more than
he already has on direct examination.
Rule 3.-Never ask a question unless you are reasonably certain what the
answer is going to be, or that, whatever it may be, it is not going to hurt you.
Rule 4 .- If you do undertake a cross-examination, know when to stop.
Sounder injunctions were never pronounced.
The purposes of cross-exaination.-The purposes of cross-exami-
nation, agreed upon by most writers, are:
j. To explain, supplement or qualify the testimony given on direct, or compel
the admission of facts inconsistent with or contrary to it.
2. In those jurisdictions where it is permitted, to elicit new matter favorable
to the cross-examiner's case.
3. To discredit or weaken the effect of the story told by the witness.
4. To discredit or weaken the witness by showing that he is unworthy of
belief.
A cross-examination, if undertaken, should have at least one of these
objects definitely in view. If it is apparent that none of thcse can be
accomplished, cross-examination is worse than useless. When an advo-
cate undertakes a cross-examination, the jury naturally expects some
result from it. If that result is not forthcoming, if all the cross-examina-
885 Wigmore, Evidence Si367 (3d ed., 194o).
34 Alumni of the Illinois College of Law (predecessor of De Paul University Law
School) will remember picturesque and lovable "Judge Hughes" as the school's pro-
fessor of criminal law and procedure in the ten years which preceded his death
in 19ti.
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tion does is to repeat and emphasize what the witness has said on direct
examination, the direct examination and the witness' credibility are
strengthened, not weakened.
The preparation for cross-examination.-As in every other aspect of
a trial, the material for cross-examination should, so far as possible, be
assembled and prepared before the jury is called into the box. In a
cross-examination directed to the opposing party, every letter he has
written or statement he may have made should be ready at hand as a
basis for impeaching questions. If the case has been tried before, or if,
as happens in some criminal or accident cases, there has been an exami-
nation of the witness at an inquest or preliminary hearing, the earlier
record should be studied and marked for use as possible impeachment.
If it is intended to direct the cross-examination of any witness to his
credibility, the exact facts relied upon should be ascertained, and be
ready at hand. If an expected adverse witness has been convicted of a
crime, and it is intended to use that fact as impeachment, the advocate
should have in his file a certified copy of the record of such conviction
and be ready with proof of the identity of the witness with the de-
fendant named. If it is expected that physicians, questioned document
examiners or other experts will testify, the advocate should, to the ex-
tent possible, familiarize himself with the general subject at inquiry
and be advised of the experience of the expert, and of everything he
may previously have testified to or written on the subject.
An examination of the records of famous trials will show that devas-
tating cross-examinations are invariably the result of information in
hand secured as the result of searching pre-trial investigation. Lord
Carson's cross-examination of Pigott in the Parnell investigations and in
the famous libel action brought against the Marquis of Queensbury by
Oscar Wilde; the cross-examination of Dr. Stevenson by Sir Edward
Clarke in his successful defense of Adelaide Bartlett for murder; the
cross-examination of the plaintiff by Mr. William Everts in the action
for damages for criminal conversation brought by Tilton against
Henry Ward Beecher; and the cross-examination of State Senator
Foelker by Mr. Max Steuer in his successful defense of Senator Frank
Gardner for bribery, are only a few of the many instances that could
be cited.
Determination of whether or not to cross-exarnine.-As previously
stated in Hughes' Rule No. I, unless you have sound reason for believ-
ing you can aid your case by bringing out some additional facts or dis-
credit the story told by the witness or discredit the witness himself, do
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not cross-examine. Nothing more definitely reveals the inexperienced
advocate than a cross-examination of every witness presented by his
adversary-usually following orderly notes taken of the direct exami-
nation, and having the witness repeat everything he said on his direct.
Such a cross-examination not only doubles by repetition the impression
already made by the witness, but holds the hazard that the witness will
clarify obscurities in his previous statements and bring in something
new and much more harmful to the cross-examiner's case than any-
thing he has previously stated. If a witness has done no particular harm,
the sound tactic is to leave him alone, not cross-examine him at all. The
impression created on a jury by a refusal to cross-examine, under such
circumstances, is quite apt to be that the direct testimony did not
amount to much.
The subject order of cross-examination.-This must depend some-
what on the circumstances of each particular case. A cross-examina-
tion which follows literally the order in which the subject matter of
the direct was presented is least calculated to produce a satisfactory
result. The witness, as the result of his pre-trial preparation and direct
examination, has learned that sequence and is usually ready with his
answer before the question is finished. Neither is it ordinarily good tac-
tics to commence with the subject matter last testified to for this is
fresh in his mind and he is not likely to contradict himself if immediate-
ly cross-examined on it. The most effective cross-examination is one
which follows no particular order but skips from one subject to another
without regard to the direct sequence, so as not to give the witness a
chance to calculate the effect of a particular answer on his testimony
as a whole or for its consistency with what he may have previously said.
If the cross-examiner has material in hand for impeachment, it be-
comes a question, depending largely upon the type of the witness,
whether to put the impeaching questions to him before examining him
on the details of his direct examination or afterwards. Ordinarily, the
experienced advocate will adopt the latter course, and get the witness
to restate and emphasize the matters for which he has the impeaching
material. On the other hand, if the impeachment is of a devastating
character, by putting it to the witness as a first question in his cross-
examination, he may so completely confuse and embarrass the witness
that he will be completely "off balance" during the remainder of the
examination.
If the cross-examiner is in possession of impeaching material directed
both to the story told by the witness and the witness himself, it is con-
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sidered by most advocates better to attack the story first and climax the
collapse of the story with the destruction of the witness.
Cross-examination to explain, qualify or supplement the direct.-
One of the purposes in undertaking a cross-examination may be to ex-
plain, qualify or supplement the testimony given by the witness on
direct examination. Indeed, if a witness has no motive or interest in mis-
representing, has apparently told what he believes to be the truth and
the cross-examiner is in possession of no prior inconsistent statements or
other information with which to impeach him, the only reason for
cross-examination is the belief that the witness may be induced to quali-
fy his direct examination or make some favorable addition to it. Such
a belief, however, should be based upon what the examiner believes to
be the actual facts as determined from his own thorough pre-trial
investigation. Such a cross-examination should never be undertaken to
develop trifling inconsistencies. A jury is not impressed by such a
cross-examination. On the contrary, it is apt to form the impression
that the cross-examiner is a mere quibbler trying to divert attention
from the real issues in the case.
Cross-examination to test memory.-This is one of the most frequent
types of cross-examination and, if deemed advisable, can usually be
undertaken without fear of untoward consequences. Many witnesses
in direct examination "remember too much and too well." A precise
memory for the time, place and attendant circumstances of an event a
year or two remote should, and usually does, excite the suspicion that
the witness has been "primed." In such a situation, a cross-examination
on collateral matters may be most effective. For instance, where a wit-
ness fixes the precise time and the details of a long prior occurrence in
which he had no especial interest, questions as to where he was, what
he did and who he talked to the day before or the day after may, and
usually do, result in a repetition of "I don't remembers" which cer-
tainly cast doubt upon the phenomenal memory for the details of the
event about which he has given direct testimony.
Cross-examination to affect credibility.-The credibility of a witness
may be affected by the production of overwhelming contradictory evi-
dence, by the improbability of his testimony, by inconsistencies in it,
by a showing that his perceptive senses are deficient, that some condi-
tion, such as drunkenness, interfered with the normal operation of his
faculties, or that his memory and judgments are unreliable. These all go
to discredit the story he tells. A cross-examination may also be under-
taken (not, however, unless material in hand justifies it) to show that
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the witness is of such a character, or has been guilty of such conduct as
to render him unworthy of belief. The more usual of these considera-
tions are:
i. Conviction and sentence for a felony or infamous crime.
2. Criminal or disgraceful conduct not evidenced by a previous conviction.
3. Corrupt disposition.
4. Interest in the case or one of the parties.
5. Bias or prejudice.
6. Falsity of testimony as shown by previously made contradictory state-
ments.
There is a wide divergence of authority as to the extent to which
previous criminal convictions or crimes may be shown to affect the
credibility of a witness. Some courts limit the inquiry to felonies, or
crimes which at common law or by statute are considered infamous,"
or as involving moral turpitude,"0 or a crimen falsi37 Others permit a
much broader inquiry-any criminal offense or immoral conduct to the
discredit of the witness .3 The practitioner should, before undertaking
a cross-examination along this line, consult and familiarize himself with
the decisions of his state and be governed accordingly. Generally, it
may be observed that such a cross-examination should never be under-
taken unless the evidence in hand is certain and there is no possibility
of a "kick back." For instance, if the witness is middle-aged or past,
and the conviction took place eighteen or twenty years before and the
witness has lived an upright life since his release from prison, the resur-
rection of his old misfortune may be resented by the jury and recoil
upon the cross-examiner. It is well to remember that in most cross-
examinations the sympathy of the jury is with the witness rather than
the lawyer.
Similarly, where an attempt is made by cross-examination to show
the corrupt disposition of a witness, the examination should not be
undertaken unless the examiner has the exact facts in hand and, if the
witness denies them, has witnesses or other evidence available to prove
them. An unsuccessful attempt to prove a witness corrupt cannot but
discredit the cross-examiner.
35 Smith v. State, iz9 Ala. 89, z9 So. 699 (9o1); Lingle v. Bulfer, 322 Ill. 6o6, 153
N.E. 589 (t926); Commonwealth v. Dorst, 285 Pa. 232, 13i At. 168 (1926).
36 Parker v. Newman, 200 Ala. 103, 75 So. 479 (1917); See v. Wormser, 129 App.
Div. 596, 113 N.Y. Supp. 1093 (2d Dep't, t9o8); Green v. State, io6 Tex. Cr. R. 335,
292 S.W. 244 (1927).
37 Commonwealth %,. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 Ad. 89 (1928); Drazen v. New Haven
Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, iit Ad. 861 (1920).
38Tla-Koo-Yel-Lee v. United States, 167 U.S. 274 (1897); People v. Winchester,
352 I11. 237, 185 N.E. 58o (1933); People v. Johnston, 228 N.Y. 332, 127 N.E. 86 (192o).
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It is always proper on cross-examination to show that the witness is
related to the party calling him; 9 that he has a direct or indirect finan-
cial interest in the case;4" that he is indebted to either of the parties or
that either of the parties is indebted to him;4' or that, because of a
similar action pending, or for any other reason, he might be affected
by the result of the trial.12 Facts developed by such a cross-examination
as this go directly to one of the principal elements affecting credibility,
i.e., the interest or lack of interest of the witness in the case or its result.
Impeachment by showing previous contradictory statements.-A
party or a witness may be cross-examined as to both oral and written
previous contradictory statements. The scope of the written material
that may be so used is broad-anything which represents a previous
statement made or authorized by the witness. In addition to earlier
records of testimony or written statements which relate directly to the
subject matter under inquiry, resort may be had to letters written by
the witness,4' 3 a will, 4 income tax returns, 5 receipts,46 a diary,47 books
of account,48 or other material written or kept under his direction.4 9
The suggested contradiction which is made the basis for the impeach-
ing question must be clear and unequivocal.50
The advantage of effective impeaching material is sometimes lost by
the failure of an inexperienced advocate to lay a proper foundation for
its introduction. As applied to a party to an action, no foundation need
be laid. Whether asked about the alleged contradictory statement on
cross-examination or not, the prevailing rule is that the statement may
39 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Handy, 2o8 Ill. 81, 69 N.E. 917 (1904) ; 3 Wigmore, Evi-
dence S 949 (3 d ed., 1940) and cases cited.
40 Alabama Power Co. v. Gladden, 237 Ala. 527, 187 So. 711 (1939); People v. Loris,
131 App. Div. 127, 115 N.Y. Supp. 236 (2d Dep't, 19O9).
41 Fitzgerald v. Young, 225 Mass. 116, 113 N.E. 777 (1916); Hellstrom v. First
Guaranty Bank, 54 N.D. 166, zo9 N.W. 212 (19z6).
42 Purifoy v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 218 Ala. 1i, 117 So. 466 (1928); Lang v. Mar-
shallton Light, Power & Ry. Co., 185 Iowa 940, 17o N.W. 463 (1919).
43 Pirek v. Scott, 2o6 Ill. App. 44 (1917).
44 People v. Blanchard, 71 Cal. App. 402, 235 Pac. 467 (1975).
45 Flannigan v. State, 125 Neb. 519, 25o N.W. 9o8 (1933).
46 Evans v. State, 1o9 Ala. i 1, 19 So. 535 0896).
47 People v. Blanchard, 71 Cal. App. 402, 235 Pac. 467 (1925).
4S State v. Groene, 179 Minn. 187, 228 N.Y. 615 (1930).
49Graff v. Tinkham, 202 Wis. 141, 23 1 N.W. 593 (1930); Hoskins v. Velasco Na-
tional Bank, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 246, 107 S.W. 598 (1907).
50 Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430 (1884); Miller v. Commonwealth, 182 Ky. 438,
2o6 S.W. 630 (918); Foster v. Worthing, 146 Mass. 607, 16 N.E. 572 (888).
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be offered at the appropriate time as a declaration or admission against
interest.5' As to witnesses who are not parties, the rule is different. In
such cases, the general rule is that the witness' attention must be specif-
ically directed to the precise statement, the time and place when and
where it is claimed to have been made, the persons present and the cir-
cumstances under which it was made.52 The purpose of this, as declared
by Mr. Justice Waite in In re Steamboat Charles Morgan," is that "his
attention [may be] particularly directed to the circumstances in such a
way as to give him full opportunity for explanation or exculpation if he
desires to make it."
The usual form of impeaching question where the supporting evi-
dence is a transcript of testimony given upon a former trial is as fol-
lows:
Q. Mr. -- , you were a witness in this case when it was tried before, were
you not?
Q. That was on August 15, 1943, before his Honor, Judge Jones, in this court
house, wasn't it?
Q. At that time and place were you not asked this question (quoted literally
from the transcript) and did you not make this answer (also quoted literally
from the transcript)?
Where such a transcript or a previous written statement is not avail-
able, a substitute for the third question above may be:
Q. At that time and place, in the presence of the persons I have named,
were you not asked in substance this question (stated according to the most
accurate information in hand), and did you not in substance make this answer
(similarly stated)?
Where the material in hand for impeachment is in writing, either
signed by the witness, or put out or authorized by him, to make such a
writing competent later, his attention must be specifically directed to
it.54 The paper or the part of it containing the alleged impeachment
must be shown to the witness and he must be afforded an opportunity
51 Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Wade, 2o6 Il1. 523, 69 N.E. 56S (1903); State v. McCook,
zo6 Iowa 6z9, z2 N.W. 59 (1928); In re Bossom's Will, 195 App. Div. 339, 186 N.Y.
Supp. 782 (3d Dep't, 1921); but for exceptions to this general rule, see: Young v.
Brady, 94 Cal. 1z8, 29 Pac. 489 (1892); Brown v. Calumet River Ry. Co., 1z5 111. 6oo,
8 N.E. 283 (1888); State v. Martin, 56 S.W. zd 137 (Mo., 1932).
52 Mattox v. United States, iS6 U.S. 237 (1895); People v. Perri, 381 I. 244, 44 N.E.
2d 857 (1942).
3 115 US. 69 (188S).
54 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Artery, 137 US. 507 (189o);
Froeming v. Stockton Electric Ry. Co., 171 Cal. 4o1, 153 Pay. 712 (916); Helgesen v,
Chicago Suburban Water & Light Co, i6 Ill. App. 541 (1910).
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to accept or reject it,55 or admit or deny his signature, if it is claimed
he signed it."
Manner and style of cross-exaination.-No general rule can be laid
down for a style of cross-examination adapted to all cases. The style
of an advocate's cross-examination will necessarily, to a greater or less
extent, reflect the natural manner, habit and disposition of the examiner.
Speaking generally, there are two prevailing styles: the savage, slashing,
"hammer and tongs" method of going after a witness "to make him tell
the truth," and the smiling, soft-spoken, ingratiating method directed
to lulling the witness into a sense of security and gaining his confidence.
Neither style can be adopted to the exclusion of the other for every
situation that may be presented. There are many situations where a
vigorous, rapid-fire examination is likely to produce the best results,
just as there are many situations where a quiet, easy, friendly examina-
tion will elicit more that is favorable to the examiner. In most cases, it
is believed, it will be found that the gentler approach is better calculated
to evoke the concessions which the examiner desires. It is again emipha-
sized that, so far as tile jury is concerned, the witness is the "under
dog"; its sympathies are naturally with him.
Keeping control of the witness.-An important "don't" for the
young trial lawyer is: Don't let a witness on cross-examination get
beyond your control; in other words, ask your questions, so far as pos-
sible, so as to compel a "yes" or "no" answer. Some experienced advo-
cates say: Never ask a witness a question which commences with
"what" or "why," the reason being that such a question "opens the
door" and permits the witness to expand and argue his direct examina-
tion. By asking properly worded questions calling for categorical
answers, the witness is kept within the bounds of his direct examination.
If, despite the restricted question, he attempts to give an unresponsive
answer, the court, on protest, will usually strike it out and compel him
to answer the question responsively. It must always be borne in mind
that a damaging answer given under cross-examination makes a much
deeper impression on a juror's mind than would have been the case had
the same answer been given on direct examination.
Knowing when to stop.-If the young advocate feels that he has a
definite purpose in mind and must cross-examine, it is well to bear in
Kennedy v. State, 240 Ala. 89, 196 So. 884 (1940); State v. Stallings, 326 Mo. 1037,
33 S.V. 2d 914 (1930); Larkin v. Nassau Electric Rv. Co., 2o5 N.Y. 267, 98 N.E. 465
(1912).
56 Kimble v. Kiser, 59 F. 2d 6:6 (C.A. 4 0h, 1932); Illinois Central Rv. Co. v. Wade,
2o6 Ill. 523, 69 N.E. 565 (1903).
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mind the caution so often sounded by the old masters of the game: do
not ask any unnecessary questions; do not ask any question unless you
can be reasonably sure of what the answer is going to be; when you
have gotten from the witness the admission you want, don't labor his
answer in an attempt to strengthen it by repetition or greater detail or
exactness (the witness may sense the significance of the admission and
modify it to your disadvantage); and, finally, when you have scored
your point, stop. The persuasive effect of an otherwise successful cross-
examination is frequently lost when the advocate continues pointless
questioning and ends on immaterialities. Wherever possible, finish on a
high note.
Redirect examination.-Although not logically under this heading, a
word or two on the redirect that may follow cross-examination may
not be amiss. The general purposes of redirect examination are to
clarify obscurities and uncertainties developed in the cross-examination
and to supplement it, so that the entire examination of the witness-
direct, cross and redirect-will fairly represent the complete knowledge
of the witness as to the matters about which he has testified. More
specifically, the purposes are:
i. To correct mistakes in the cross-examination.
z. To explain or qualify statements made on cross-examination.
3. To make necessary amplifications where only part of a transaction or state-
ment has been elicited on cross-examination.
4. To refresh the witness' memory, where on cross-examination he has denied
a recollection of certain matters.
5. To develop relevant new matter to explain, qualify or supplement matter
elicited on cross-examination.
6. To state reasons as an explanation for certain answers on cross-examination.
7. To refute unjustifiable inferences created by cross-examination.
8. To rehabilitate the witness where the cross-examination has tended to dis-
credit him.
The determination whether or not to risk a redirect examination is a
difficult one. If the witness has not been discredited or hopelessly con-
fused, such an examination may safely be undertaken for any one of the
first seven purposes above mentioned; but even in these instances the
matters sought to be corrected or inquired about should be substantial.
Where his witness has been badly discredited by cross-examination,
the advocate must quickly balance the possibilities of rehabilitating him
against the possibility of emphasizing the discrediting circumstances,
and making a bad matter worse. Many times it is the better part of dis-
cretion to appear undisturbed and dismiss the witness without further
questions.
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VI. ARGUMENT
The argument or "summing up" is, of course, the advocate's most
direct attempt at persuasion.
It is not within the scope of this article to discuss in detail the proper
content of argument in particular cases, or the manner in which partic-
ular questions may best be presented. What is pertinent is a general
statement of the permissible range of argument, and the type and man-
ner of argument most calculated to be persuasive.
The range of argument.-Nowhere has the legitimate range of argu-
ment been better stated than in the early New Hampshire case of
Tucker v. Henniker.5 7 There the court said:
The counsel represents and is a substitute for his client; whatever, therefore,
the client may do in the management of his cause may be done by his counsel.
The largest and most liberal freedom of speech is allowed, and the law pro-
tects him in it.... The range of discussion is wide .... In his addresses to thejury, it is his privilege to descant upon the facts proved or admitted in the
pleadings; to arraign the conduct of the parties; to impugn, excuse, justify or
condemn motives, so far as they are developed in evidence, assail the credibility
of witnesses when it is impeached by direct evidence or by the inconsistency or
incoherence of their testimony, their manner of testifying, their appearance upon
the stand or by circumstances. His illustrations may be as various as the re-
sources of his genius; his argumentation as full and profound as his learning can
make it; and he may, if he will, give play to his wit, or wings to his imagination.
To his freedom of speech, however, there are some limitations. His manner must
be decorous. All courts have the power to protect themselves from contempt
and indecency in words or sentiments is contempt.... So, too, what a counsel
does or says in the argument of a cause must be pertinent to the matter on trial
before the jury, and he takes the hazard of its not being so.
Proper and improper argument.-What is and what is not proper
argument? While the dispositions of particular courts of last resort
vary, some holding a rather tight rein on counsel and some making
more liberal allowance for "extravagant statements made in the heat of
battle," it can be said that an advocate may properly argue anything
within the issues in the case, and supported by the record, provided he
does it without resort to direct appeals to passion or prejudice.
The advocate's presentation may be vigorous and discrediting char-
acterizations of witnesses and testimony may be made when the record
warrants them,5" but an argument of matters outside the record, or sen-
sational appeals to arouse the passions or prejudices of the jury, defeat
their own purpose. If the advocate indulging in such arguments obtains
57 41 N.H. 317 0 86o).
5 8 North American Restaurant & Oyster House v. McFlligott, 227 Ill. 317, 8 N.E.
388 (1907).
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a verdict, his overstepping of the bounds may result in a new trial or a
reversal on appeal. Particularly is this true in "close cases," that is, cases
in which the evidence is conflicting and fairly evenly balanced.
Avoiding error.-If during the heat of argument an objection is made
to a statement as being outside of or contrary to the evidence, the
speaker can usually avoid error by promptly withdrawing the state-
ment, or by saying, "That is my recollection of the evidence, but it is
for you, gentlemen of the jury, to say what the evidence is; if you find
that is not the evidence, disregard my statement." If the objection goes
to what is charged to be an improper characterization of a witness or
particular evidence, it is a good tactic to withdraw the statement un-
equivocally. 9 Ordinarily, no claim of error can be predicated upon
alleged improper argument unless it is specifically objected to, and
ruling of the court obtained thereon. 0
A long argument often defeats its purpose.-Argument should be no
longer than is necessary. Many a case is lost or harmed by over-argu-
ment. On the other hand, a case is often aided by a short crisp argu-
ment which suggests the confidence of the advocate that the evidence
is so clear it needs but little exposition. A careful preparation for argu-
ment, which should include in handy reference notes an outline of
essential points to be covered, will tend to keep an argument within
reasonable bounds. Experience prompts the observation that a jury will
listen attentively to a simply stated, well arranged and forcefully pre-
sented argument in which the main points of controversy are succes-
sively presented and the end can be foreseen, but that it is quickly bored
by a slow, rambling, unplanned and undirected discourse which may
lead it to wonder if it will be completed within the jury's prescribed
term of service.
Methods of persuasion.-Persuasion is an unconscious operation, and
there are as many ways of inducing it as there are varieties of argument.
The direct method of stating facts and conclusions deducible there-
from and asking the jury to accept those conclusions is one way. To
state the facts and invite the jury to draw logical conclusions therefrom
is another. Another is to suggest that certain facts are significant, in
that they permit or compel certain inferences and then by interroga-
tion leave it to the jury to answer whether one or another inference
59 Simonich v. Chicago & Alton Ry. Co., 217 I1. App. 336 (1920); O'Dell v. Straith,
2o8 Mich. 497, 175 N.W. 441 (1919); University of Illinois v. Spalding, 7 N.H. 163,
5t At. 731 (190).
60 Bleich v. People, 227 Ill. 8o, 81 N.E. 36 (1907); Cattano v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co,
173 N.Y. 565, 66 N.E. 563 (19o3).
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may fairly be drawn. Speaking broadly, jurors sometimes resent the
direct, positive, dogmatic approach which carries with it the implica-
tion: "There it is; you have to take it." Many advocates prefer the
subtler, indirect method by which the jury is invited rather than forced
to give its adherence to conclusions upon which it will base its verdict.
The use of plain English.-The desirability of the use of plain but
good English in argument cannot be overstressed. This does not imply
that jurors should be "talked down to" as though they were of an
inferior mentality; what is meant is that the advocate should use the
language of their every-day association and business. The noisy oratory
of an earlier day, in which quite ordinary transactions were couched in
classical prose or poetry and copiously embellished with historical
allusion, has largely passed. Argument is most effective which is stated
in the tone of ordinary conversation, with just enough vigor directed to
important items of evidence or circumstances to rivet them in the
minds of the jurors.
The prime essential.-If one element is to be stressed above all others
as essential to persuasion through argument, it is the earnestness and
sincerity of the advocate. An examination of the long and interesting
record of successful advocacy will reveal that the great masters of the
art have trusted to the solid ground of sincere conviction derived from
complete familiarity with the case in hand, a keen perception of its
merits or weaknesses, and their ability, through fair, logical and earnest
argument, to persuade the jury to share their convictions. Lord Camp-
bell, in his "Lives of the Chancellors,""1 gives brilliant expression to this
view in his estimate of the arguments of Thomas (Lord) Erskine, one
of the greatest advocates of all time:
In considering the characteristics of his eloquence it is observable that he was
not only free from measured sententiousness and tiresome attempts at antithesis,
but that he was not indebted for his success to riches of ornament, to felicity of
illustration, to wit, to humor, or to sarcasm.... Earnestness and energy were
ever present in his speeches-impressing his argument on the mind of his hearers
with a force which seemed to compel conviction. He never spoke at tiresome
length; throughout all his speeches no weakness, no dullness, no flagging is dis-
coverable; and we have ever a lively statement of facts-or reasoning, pointed,
logical and triumphant.
VII. CONCLUSION
The obligation of the trial lawyer engaged to try a jury case because
of his assumed superiority in the art of advocacy, is to give his client the
61 4 Campbell, Lives of Chancellors 81-82 (5th ed., 1868).
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best possible representation and persuade the jury to a verdict in his
client's favor. That obligation cannot be discharged without (a) a
thorough pre-trial preparation which puts him in possession of every
available fact-favorable or unfavorable-in the case; (b) a pre-trial
determination upon an accurate and persuasive opening statement; (c)
a pre-trial determination upon an order for the presentation of his wit-
nesses best calculated to impress and persuade; (d) an intelligent, un-
derstandable and persuasive presentation of his evidence; (e) intelli-
gently conceived and executed cross-examinations; and (f) argument,
persuasive, and it is to be hoped, convincing, because of its proper
content, its manner of statement and, above all, its sincerity.
